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1 Introduction
The growing income and wealth inequalities have recently become one of the defining char-
acteristics of advanced economies. The notable contribution of Piketty (2014) distinctly docu-
mented the lasting stagnation ofmedianwages, and especially the expanding share in national
income held by top income households. It is actually accepted that inequality is shaped in the
long-run by technological progress and political power struggles (see e.g. Roine and Walden-
ström (2015)). On the economic policy side, taxation and fiscal transfers are the traditional
instruments that impact households income and wealth.
Monetary policy was commonly believed to be neutral with respect to inequality. Indeed,
central banks’ mandate primarily deals with preserving stable prices and sound economic
conditions. However, given the non-standard measures implemented by central banks in re-
sponse to the great recession, the view that monetary policy could widen income disparities
– e.g. through higher asset prices and lower saving returns – has become increasingly pop-
ular. This debate was particularly heated in the U.S, given that households mainly rely on
labor incomes, while a minority receives an important share of their income in the form of
dividends and capital gains. In the Euro Area (EA henceforth), as soon as the ECB activated
its unconventional monetary policy toolbox, questions also arose as to its possible side effects
on inequality.
This paper examines the distributional effects of monetary policy in 10 EA economies over the
period 2000-2015. We rely on three measures of income inequality: the Gini coefficient, the net
Gini and the S80/S20 ratio. These measures allow to appraise the impact on inequality before
and after redistribution, and also to consider if monetary policy widens inequality between
high and low income earners. In order to account for monetary policy stance in the EA, we
use the nominal short-term interest rate (as a policy rate) along with the shadow rate of Wu
and Xia (2016). The latter encompasses standard and non-standard monetary policies. Our
empirical approach features a Panel VAR setting where monetary policy shocks are identified
using a Cholesky decomposition scheme. Such identification method consists of categorizing
endogenous variables from slow to fast moving variables.
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A growing body of research has attempted to document, from a short-run perspective, the
effects of monetary policy shocks on income inequality. In the U.S., Coibion et al. (2017) use
micro level data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), and find that contractionary
monetary policy contributed to increase income inequality during the period 1980-2008. Mum-
taz and Theophilopoulou (2017) rely on similar data of U.K. households from 1969 to 2012
and come up to the same conclusion. While the literature on the redistributive effects of un-
conventional monetary policy is still in progress, the reduction in income inequality – though
small in magnitude – seems to be the most dominant effect (see e.g. Bivens (2015), Inui et al.
(2017) or Colciago et al. (2019) for a complete survey on this issue).
At the EA level, Guerello (2018) builds a proxy of changes in income dispersion out of the Euro-
pean Commission Consumer Survey and studies the distributional implications of monetary
policy in 12 EA countries for the period 1999-2014. The contribution of our paper departs from
Guerello (2018) in two important respects: (i) we use proper income inequality data from the
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), supplemented by an inter-decile
ratio (S80/S20), and (ii) instead of using ECB balance sheet to identify non-standard policies,
monetary policy shocks are extracted from innovations to the short-term and the shadow rates.
Our results suggest that monetary policy has only a modest impact on income inequality.
An unexpected increase in the policy rate or the shadow rate rises the Gini coefficient by
respectively 0.1 and 0.12. Such impact is more than halved when we consider instead the net
Gini and the S80/S20 ratio, but remains as persistent as the Gini coefficient. This evidence is
mainly driven by Southern European economies and conventional monetary policies. Also,
non-standard monetary policy does not yield striking differences in terms of impact on in-
equality, in comparison with conventional monetary policy. These findings are robust to a
battery of robustness checks, which consider different sets of ordering, data sources andmodel
specifications.
The paper is outlined as follows: Section 2 discusses the data and recent trends of income
inequality in the EA. Section 3 sheds light on the estimation methodology, by specifying the
empirical model and how monetary policy shocks are identified. Section 4 reports the Panel
VAR results, while the fifth and last section concludes.
3
2 Data
The empirical analysis covers the period 2000Q3-2015Q3 and focuses on 10 EA economies,
which account for more than 80 percent of the EA’s GDP. Countries include: Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The period
choice is limited on the one hand by the availability of data on income inequality and, on the
other hand, by the presence of structural breaks prior to 2000 as EA countries did not share
similar macroeconomic characteristics.1
Addressing the topic of monetary policy and inequality requires ideally extensive surveys
on households with large information on household incomes, assets and liabilities (see e.g.
Coibion et al. (2017) or Albert and Gómez-Fernández (2018) for the U.S., Casiraghi et al.
(2018) for Italy, Feldkircher and Kakamu (2018) for Japan and Park (2018) for South Korea).
As far as the EA is concerned, the Household Finance and Consumption Survey2 (HFCS)
has been released for the first time in 2010 and contains only two waves, which makes it
difficult to investigate how the ECB’s monetary policy decisions have shaped income and
wealth distribution. At the country level, household surveys are conducted at best on an
annual basis and combining them would be a big deal given that they incorporate different
definitions of income.
We are thus left relying on annual standardized data on income inequality. Therefore, we
bypass issues related to different cross-national income definitions; this makes comparisons
between countries more reliable. Given that our empirical analysis features a Panel VAR
framework, it is also desirable (if not necessary) to have a relatively long estimation sample. To
do so, we apply linear interpolation techniques to convert income inequality measures from
the annual frequency to quarterly series. Such approach is justified by the fact that measures
of income inequality generally show small variations in the short-run and could therefore be
considered as slow-moving variables. Hence, interpolation does not change the information
conveyed in a substantial way.
1Ireland is excluded from the sample due to the large recent revisions in macroeconomic data. Also, countries that have
only recently joined the EA are excluded to limit breaks in time series.
2Adam& Tzamourani (2016) and Lenza & Slacalek (2018) use the available waves of the HFCS to derive households balance
sheets per quantile in the EA and conduct microsimulations to determine who is likely to benefit from the monetary policy
measures implemented by the ECB.
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Time disaggregation of data on income inequality has been recently used in the literature
on distributional impacts of monetary policy. For instance, Davtyan (2017) converts the Gini
index in the United States to quarterly series using the interpolationmethod proposed by Boot
et al. (1967). In our case, we follow the method of Chow and Lin (1971), which performs a
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression of the annual values on the annualized quarterly
indicator series.3 According to Angelini et al. (2006) who develop a new method for data in-
terpolation summarizing large information sets, Chow-Lin interpolation continues to perform
well as they find that the ranking of factor-based interpolation and Chow–Lin is not clear-cut.
And according to Sax and Steiner (2013), Chow-Lin interpolation is better suited for stationary
or cointegrated series.
Precisely, data on Gini coefficients – a standard measure of income dispersion whose value
ranges from 0 to 100 – are collected from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database
(SWIID) produced by Solt (2018). The SWIID uses available information on income inequality
from various sources, and then applies interpolation and imputation techniques to fullfil
missing country-years observations. This allows to obtain the highest possible coverage (see
Lang and Tavares (2018) on how different datasets of income inequality deal with issues
related to availability, comparability and measurement methods). To better account for the
interaction between monetary and fiscal policy, the Gini coefficients are considered both in
terms of market income (pre-tax, pre-transfer) and disposable income (post-tax, post-transfer).
It is well established that the Gini coefficient tends to relatively attach a greater importance
for observations in the middle of the distribution than those located at the extremes (Cobham
and Sumner (2014)). This is why we add an additional inequality measure : S80/S20, which
is the ratio of the average income of the 20 percent richest to the 20 percent poorest. This
indicator is obtained from OECD (2017) and allows to take into account in our analysis the
impact of monetary policy on the tails of income distribution. Since the S80/S20 ratio contains
missing observations for some countries between 2002 and 2003, we use as well the Chow-Lin
interpolation method to fill in the missing data and convert them afterwards to quarterly
series.
3This exercise is performedusing ECOTRIM, a software developed by Eurostat. We provide in Subsection 7.1 of the appendix
a technical review of how interpolation à la Chow and Lin (1971) specifically works.
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Along with the three measures of income inequality, other macroeconomic and monetary
variables are included. The country-level data include real GDP, consumption deflator, stock
prices, the total employed population and a real house price index.4 Monetary policy stance is
proxied by the short-term nominal interest rate and the shadow rate for the EA of Wu and Xia
(2016). While the first allows to grasp only conventional monetary policy, the second captures
episodes of unconventional monetary policy implementation by the ECB. All variables enter
in log levels except the short term interest rate, shadow rate and the three inequality measures.
2.1 Income inequality in the Eurozone
Before setting up the empirical methodology, we draw a broad picture on the state of income
inequality in the 10 EA economies included in our study. We conduct this exercise by consid-
ering two country-groups: the core which features the richest Northern European countries in
terms ofGDPper capita (i.e. Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and theNetherlands)
and the periphery or Southern European countries (i.e. Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal).
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Figure 1: Income inequality in Northern European economies, 2000-2015
Note: Data on Gini for market income, Gini for disposable income and the S80/S20 ratio are plotted from the SWIID and OECD.
As illustrated in figures 1 and 2, income inequality strongly increased both in the core and
periphery countries of the EA. With the exception of Germany and Austria, the core member-
states countries have witnessed however a slower rise in the Gini for market income compared
4See Table 1 in appendix for detailed information on data.
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to the periphery countries. Actually, the upward shift these countries have experienced was
more pronounced following the Great Recession, particularly for Spain and Greece.
The Gini for disposable income highlights how fiscal policy and redistribution can lower in-
comedisparities. This turns out to be particularly true inNorthern European economieswhere
thismeasure is structurally lower in comparisonwith their counterparts in Southern European
economies. Moreover, movements observed in the Gini for disposable income are relatively
close to those we noticed in the Gini for market income. Indeed, while the Gini for dispos-
able incomedecreased in Belgium, it has significantly increased in France, Germany and Spain.
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Figure 2: Income inequality in Southern European economies, 2000-2015
Note: Data on Gini for market income, Gini for disposable income and the S80/S20 ratio are plotted from the SWIID and OECD.
Similarly, the S80/S20 ratios of the 10 EA economies suggest that income inequality is lower
in Northern Europe and support the assertion that richest countries in the EA are the most
equal in terms of income distribution. Although decile ratios do not tend to vary much, the
S80/S20 increased in Germany and Spain by respectively 42 and 27 percent between 2000 and
2015, which is economically considerable. This measure offers a first-hand illustration of how
monetary policy – either conventional or unconventional – could shape income inequality. In
fact, the extent to which central banks could boost asset prices or enhance employment and
wages – on which low income earners rely substantially – could have a strong impact on the
development of the S80/S20 ratio. We will empirically test if monetary policy shocks widen
income disparities between top and bottom income earners.
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3 Empirical methodology
3.1 Identification strategy
The identification of monetary policy shocks first raises the question of how to disentangle
conventional from unconventional monetary policy measures. This issue is more demanding
for the EA where monetary policy measures are decided for the Euro Area as a whole and
may impact domestic economies heterogeneously.
Several alternatives have been put forward in the literature. For the EA, Guerello (2018)
identified non-standard monetary measures as innovations to the ECB balance sheet, and
conventional measures were identified from short-term nominal interest rate innovations.
Guerello (2018) adopted this approach to identify monetary policy shocks both on aggregate
Eurozone data and a panel of 12 EA countries. For Japan, Inui et al. (2017) followed the
same strategy to identify standard monetary policy for the period 1981Q1-1998Q4. However,
starting from 1999Q1, they used the shadow rate of Krippner (2015) in order to account for the
distributional effects during the prolonged period of unconventional monetary policy.
We follow the same approach as Inui et al. (2017) in our analysis by using the shadow rate
developed by Wu and Xia (2016) for the EA.
Shadow rates could be perceived as a substitute of standard policy rates in times of Zero Lower
Bound (ZLB). Put differently, they address the following question: what would have been the
level of nominal interest rates had they been allowed to move below zero? Indeed when
short-term interest rates reach the ZLB, shadow rates are likely to become negative if central
banks continue to implement other forms ofmonetary policy that go beyond themanipulation
of interest rates.
In a context of ZLB, as noted by Francis et al. (2017), shadow rates proved to be good
proxies of monetary policy stance.5 Most importantly, unlike the central bank balance sheet,
they particularly allow to capture all the unconventional monetary policy toolkit, including
(T)LTRO for instance, instead of only asset purchase programs. Figure 3 below plots the time
path of the shadow rate and short-term interest rate for the EA. Following ECB’s non-standard
5Several shadow rates – which have mainly built on term structure models – have been proposed by De Rezende and
Ristiniemi (2017) and Krippner (2015). See Ichiue and Ueno (2015) for a complete survey of shadow rates and their differences.
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monetary policy actions, the shadow rate started deviating from the short-term interest rate as
of 2004Q3, and entered the negative territory for the first time in 2009Q3 and then in 2012Q1
as the short-term nominal interest decreased towards the ZLB.
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Short-term interest rate Shadow rate
Figure 3.1: Policy rates in the Euro Area
Monetary policy shocks are identified as innovations to policy rates (short-term nominal
interest rate and shadow rate, alternatively), which do not contemporaneously affect macroe-
conomic conditions. Specifically, our shocks identification scheme relies on a Cholesky de-
composition6 with the following ordering of variables:
Yit =

Inequality measure
Output
Prices
Policy instrument
Stock returns

This ordering implies, on the one hand, that income inequality, output and price levels respond
with a lag to an unexpected increase in the policy rate. On the other hand, stock prices
6This identification scheme and its implications have been widely discussed by Christiano et al. (1999).
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are allowed to react within the same quarter to a monetary policy shock. Ordering real
variables before financial ones is a widely-adopted practice in the macroeconomic literature,
and underlines the idea that stock markets may respond immediately to real shocks. For what
concerns the ordering of income inequality measures, we will test for the sensitivity of this
identification scheme by considering different sets of ordering.
A possible concern regarding our identification strategy may be that we adopt a country-
level approach for exogenous monetary policy shocks instead of estimating the latter at the
EA level. Samarina and Nguyen (2019), for instance, follow the last approach by including
the EA’s monetary policy shocks into a PVARX in order to estimate their effect on the Gini
coefficient. We believe, however, that such approach could potentially lead to the attrition of
the scope ofmonetary policy shocks and consequently alter the outcome on income inequality.
To put it differently, the identification of monetary policy shocks at the EA level stems from
the estimation of a reaction function by the ECB. In contrast, we do not estimate reaction
functions. We compute instead country-level shocks as the deviation between the common
policy (or shadow) rate (which implicitly depends on variables at the EA level and an error
term) and the country-level macroeconomic conditions. Hence we assert that desynchronized
business cycles across EA countries will impinge on the nature and size of domestic policy
shocks induced by the common ECB policy: a high (resp. low)-growth country takes the
common interest rate as too-low (resp. high) as regards its domestic economic condition, and
therefore faces a destabilizing policy that we define as a shock to its economy.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 in section 6 report monetary policy shocks for each country, using the
nominal short-term interest rate and the shadow rate, respectively. At first glance, the general
pattern of the figures indicates that country-level shocks do not significantly differ from the
monetary surprises documented by, for instance, Jarocinski and Karadi (2015) for the EA.
However, some differences between countries in terms of monetary policy stance are worth
noting. For example, in Figure 3.2, towards the end of the period, when monetary policy
shocks are expansionary, particularly in Germany and Finland, the latter are restrictive in
Greece.
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3.2 Panel VAR
In order to empirically assess the dynamic interaction between monetary policy and income
inequality in the EA, we use a panel VAR framework. The panel dimension allows to differen-
tiate dynamics across countries via the estimation of country-fixed effects while shedding light
on the whole area dynamics. The VAR approach has the advantage to tackle the endogeneity
problem, since it allows for endogenous interaction between variables in the system.
The Panel VAR is estimated using the Least Squares Dummy Variable estimator (LSDV).7
Specifically, country-fixed effects are included inorder to account for the country time-invariant
characteristics. In dynamic panel datamodels, the LSDV estimator is nonetheless inconsistent,
whether individual effects are considered as fixed or random. This is known as the dynamic
panel bias. As shown by Nickell (1981), this bias stems from the correlation between lagged
endogenous variables and unobserved time-invariant characteristics. Consequently, the LSDV
estimator is consistent only when the number of time observations in the data set tends to
infinity. Yet, the importance of this bias decreases as the length of the sample increases. Given
that our analysis aligns with a time dimension (61 observations per country) that is longer
than the country dimension (10 countries), we believe that this bias remains small. The Monte
Carlo evidence provided by Judson and Owen (1999)8 regarding the importance of the bias in
comparison to the sample size supports our assertion.
We checked the robustness of Least Squares Dummy VARs conducting the empirical analysis
with the Mean Group (MG) estimator described in Pesaran and Smith (1995). This estimation
method has the advantage to fit separate country-regressions and computes an arithmetic
average of the coefficients. The MG does not contradict the results obtained in the baseline
model. In the following, we thus continue relying on the LSDV estimator. The econometric
model takes the following reduced form:
Yit = A(L)Yit + αi + εit
7Cagala and Glogowsky (2014) provide a Stata code and documentation to estimate panel VAR models.
8Judson and Owen (1999) argue that when the number of time observations is higher than 20, the bias of LSDV for dynamic
panel data models is small.
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where Yit is the vector of endogenous variables, which includes: income inequality measures,
real GDP, consumption deflator, a policy rate and the stock market index. A(L) illustrates a
polynomial matrix in the lag operator with A(L) = A1L1 + A2L2 + ... + ApLp; αi is a set of
country fixed effects and εit is a vector of uncorrelated iid shocks. Intuitively, the indices i and
t respectively denote countries and quarters. Our 10 countries panel is strongly balanced for
the period 2000Q3-2015Q3.
Monetary policy shocks are identified using, as aforementioned, a recursive identification
scheme, which leads the impact matrix to be lower triangular. However, this identification
scheme generally leads to the so-called “price puzzle”, as inflation counter-intuitively reacts to
monetary policy innovations and yields inconsistent estimates. In dealing with this issue, as
suggested by Estrella (2015), we assume that prices react with a lag to unexpected changes in
the policy instrument. Such restriction is empirically documented, among others, by Bernanke
et al. (1999) and emphasizes the fact that monetary policy has a delayed impact on prices,
hence the ordering of the consumption deflator before the short-term interest rate (or shadow
rate).
Building on the estimation of the panel VAR, we are interested in generating the Impulse
Response Function (IRF) of the income inequality measure to a monetary policy shock when
the latter is calibrated as a +100 b.p. increase in the policy instrument. IRFs simulate the
response of inequality measures to an exogenous increase in the monetary policy instrument
and also allow to check if the model correctly behaves, i.e. if the responses of macroeconomic
and financial variables to amonetary policy shock are in line with the empirical literature. The
significance of the IRFs is evaluated using 90-percent confidence intervals. These intervals
are computed based on a double bootstrap re-sampling scheme with 200 replications. The
optimal number of lags, of value one, stems from the Akaike Information Criterion. The lag
number is consistent with the VAR literature: e.g. Blot et al. (2017) and Guerello (2018) use 3
lags (but with monthly data).
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4 Results
4.1 Baseline
The results obtainedafter estimating equation1use alternatively 3measures of income inequal-
ity: the (pre-social transfers) Gini coefficients, the net (post-social transfers) Gini coefficients
and the S80/S20 inter-decile ratio. As formerly mentioned, we alternatively use in our Panel
VAR two instruments of monetary policy: the policy rate and the shadow rate à la Wu-Xia.
Results of the model including the Gini coefficient are presented in Figures 4 and 5. The fig-
ures show the estimated responses to monetary shocks and their associated confidence bands.
Results report a significant impact of monetary policy on inequality. A restrictive monetary
policy increases inequality, in line with the findings documented by Coibion et al. (2017). The
impact is relatively small though, also in line with the literature (see e.g. O’Farrel et al. (2016)
for a selected panel of 8 OECD economies). A temporary positive shock on the nominal policy
rate produces a maximum impact of .1 on the Gini coefficient 3 years after the shock. When
the shock vanishes, so does its impact. The response to a shock on the shadow rate is slightly
higher but as persistent as the first reported shock. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first estimation in the EA of the impact of the shadow rate (encompassing both the standard
and non-standard monetary policy measures) on income inequality. In contrast, Guerello
(2018) uses the innovations to the ECB balance sheet as a proxy for non-standard monetary
policies only. One may argue though that unexpected changes in the balance sheet can be
either attributed to standard or non-standard policies.
The other estimated responses to a monetary policy shock are also significant and very similar
from one type of instrument (“standard”) to another (“non standard”). On top of that, they
are broadly consistent with expectations. A restrictive monetary shock of 100 b.p. reduces
the output by 2.5 percent after 3 years and inflation by 1.2 percent after 5 years. The response
of inflation lasts longer than that of the output. In contrast, stock prices move faster: the
maximum drop is achieved 2 years after the shock and the response vanishes approximately
4 years after the shock (instead of 5 years when the shadow rate is used).
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We confront our results to alternative measures of inequality: the net Gini coefficients and the
S80/S20 ratios (both IRFs on inequality measures are reported in figures 6 and 7). Doing so
allows to check the degree to which monetary policy could affect income inequality, net of the
contribution of tax policy. In the same spirit, the inter-decile ratio has the advantage to show
whether monetary policy shocks raises the gap between high-income earners and low-income
ones. It appears that results are very similar to those obtained previously.
While comparing IRFs, we notice that the main difference concerns the first year after the
(conventional or unconventional) shock, and it is limited to the response of income inequality
(other responses show similar dynamics).9 While the Gini coefficient started increasing sig-
nificantly right after the shock, the responses of the net Gini coefficient and the S80/S20 ratio
are not statistically different from zero before a year. Moreover, the maximum impacts of a
restrictive monetary policy on these two complementary measures of income inequality are
more than halved in comparison with the impact on the Gini coefficient. This suggests that
distributional effects ofmonetary policy are less potentwhen redistribution and fiscal transfers
are taken into account. Besides, the assertion that monetary policy widens disparities between
the tails of income distribution is not supported by the data.
Also in line with the findings of Coibion et al. (2017) and Guerello (2018), the Forecast Error
Variance Decomposition (FEVD) of the Gini coefficients (see figures 8 and 9) show that the
monetary policy instruments are relatively relevant in accounting for the volatility of income
inequalitymeasures in themedium-long run.10 In otherwords, they are as relevant as output or
inflation in explaining the variance of income inequality measures. It is worth noting however
that the shadow rate explains a higher share of the Gini coefficient’s volatility than the policy
rate. This makes sense inasmuch as the shadow rate encompasses numerous monetary policy
measures (i.e. asset purchase programs, credit easing facilities, forward guidance, etc.).
9Figures for the entire Panel VAR models are reported in the appendix
10The FEVD of net Gini and the S80/S20 ratio are similar to the Gini ones; they are available upon request.
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4.2 Robustness checks
To check the robustness of results, we adopt two complementary orderings. Results are
reported in figures 10 to 17.11 On the one hand, we adopt the same ordering as Guerello (2018),
with the indicator of income inequality ordered last in the vector of dependent variables. In
contrast with the baseline model, this ordering assumes a faster reaction of the indicator of
income inequality to macroeconomic and financial changes. Results confirm those from the
baseline and add only a few elements: overall, the impact of the policy and shadow rates
on indicators of income inequality is slightly higher and, as regards net Gini coefficients and
S80/S20 ratios, the impact is more significant in the short run.
On the other hand, we order the monetary policy variable last in order to “purge” it from all
possible changes in the preceding variables and therefore identify a “pure” policy shock. In
contrast with the baseline, the policy shock is also adjusted for the possible immediate impact
of stock price changes. This ordering scheme does not affect the results, which are very similar,
if not identical, to those in the baseline. In both cases, the ordering change has no impact on
the IRFs of macroeconomic and financial variables.
To make sure that our baseline results are not sensitive to the income inequality measures
considered, we estimate our Panel VAR using gross Gini series extracted from the World
Inequality Database (WID, 2017). As a matter of fact, theWID uses up-to-date national survey
statistics and does not face issues related to the imputation procedures of missing data as in
the SWIID; but features, in contrast, a narrower country coverage.12 Results are reported in
figures 18 and 19. They do not contradict our baseline findings: the effect of monetary policy
on the gross Gini – both under the policy and shadow rates – remains the same, compared to
IRFs generated using the SWIID data, although it is not statistically significant in the short-run.
In the same spirit, it is worth checking how income inequality indicators respond when using
a different proxy of unconventional monetary policies. The term structure models that build
shadow rates rely on different assumptions andmay potentially yield contrasting estimates. In
11For the Gini coefficient, we present the entire Panel VAR with both monetary policy instruments, while we only report the
response of the net Gini and the S80/S20 ratio in the main text (their respective entire IRFs are displayed in the appendix in
figures 30 to 37).
12As a case in point, Gini coefficients for Germany are not available in the WID. Hence we conduct the estimations on the
remaining 9 EA economies.
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fact, Krippner (2019) recently argued that the Wu and Xia (2016) shadow/lower-bound model
produces “wide variations in the inferred effects of unconventional monetary policy on inflation and
unemployment outcomes”. This is why we estimate our baseline model using the Shadow short
rate (SSR) of Krippner (2015). The results reported in figure 20 are consistent with those from
the baseline: a temporary positive shock on the shadow rate increases the three indicators of
income inequality. We note, however, that the maximum impact on inequality is lower and
occurs later, compared to IRFs generated with the shadow rate of Wu and Xia (2016); while
the response of the S80/S20 inter-decile ratio is less statistically significant.
4.3 Northern vs. Southern economies
It is fair to ask whether monetary policy shocks have a distinct effect between Northern and
Southern economies of the EA. As a matter of fact, while all countries have been hit by the
Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the European sovereign debt crisis has mostly hit Southern
economies of the EA. Given the fact that austerity measures may have weakened redistri-
bution in these countries, ECB policies may have contributed to mitigating their impact on
income inequalities. To empirically assess this assumption, we decompose the impact of mon-
etary shocks on income inequality between EA Northern (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany and the Netherlands) and Southern (Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal) countries.
Results are reported in figures 21 to 24 in section 6. They show that the baseline results are
mainly driven by Southern EA countries.
Indeed, in the Northern economies, the impact of monetary policy shocks on indicators of
income inequality is not different from zero, whatever the horizon. There is just one exception,
at a 1-year horizon, for the impact on S80/S20 ratio after a shock on the shadow rate. In
contrast, the impact of monetary policy shocks in the Southern countries is positive: it is only
weakly significant in the short-run on the Gini coefficient but it is highly significant in the
mid- to long-run on the S80/S20 ratio. The mitigation of the impact on income inequality by
monetary policy is full once its effect on redistribution is accounted for: monetary policy has
no impact on netGini coefficients. The same argument cannot hold for the Northern countries
where austerity measures have been much softer.
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4.4 Standard vs. non-standard monetary policies
Are the distributional effects of non-standard monetary policies more pronounced, with re-
spect to those of standard monetary policy? This question has been at the heart of the policy
debate on the distributional implications of monetary policies. To address this question, we
separately estimate on the one hand, the impact of unconventional monetary policy shocks on
income inequality from 2008Q3 to 2015Q3 and, on the other hand, the impact of conventional
monetary policy shocks on income inequality until the ZLBwas hit. Thus, in contrast with the
baseline, we alternatively remove the period over which the policy rate and the shadow rate
had the same value (more or less before the ZLB) and the period of constant policy rate (after
the ZLB).
Results are reported in figures 25 and 26. They show that baseline results are mostly driven
by conventional policies. Indeed, responses of indicators of income inequality to monetary
policies before the ZLB are very similar to those in the baseline. In contrast, shocks on the
shadow rate after 2008Q3 give only mixed results: the response of S80/S20 ratios is faster,
lower and more temporary than in the baseline; the response of the Gini coefficient is weakly
significant, when it is; and the response of the net Gini coefficient is not different from zero.
4.5 The case for missing variables
We check whether the results do not depend on missing variables. To do so, we include
three additional variables to the baseline model: inflation expectations, employment and real
estate prices. Inflation expectations are usual determinants of policy rates in the literature
on monetary rules.13 Employment can give additional information on the real dynamics of
the economy and it can also serve as a proxy for income inequality, while real estate prices
may give additional information on financial trends.14 We include these additional variables
alternatively, then we retain those that give statistically significant IRFs in an extended VAR,
and discuss the impact of monetary policy shocks on income inequality. It appears from
the results of the Panel VAR with a 6th variable15 that the IRFs of inflation expectations are
13The estimaton of monetary rules is implicit in the identification of policy shocks that we follow.
14Real estate prices can move differently from stock prices.
15IRFs are available upon request. In the successive VAR estimations, 1-year inflation expectations and employment were
respectively ordered between GDP and the price deflator whereas real estate prices were ordered between the policy rate (or
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never significant after a monetary shock. We therefore end up studying a VAR(7) including
employment (ordered 3rd in the VAR) and real estate price index (ordered 6th). Results are
reported in figures 27 and 28. They confirm the baseline results about income inequality and,
meanwhile, they show that the full empirical model has good properties: IRFs are statistically
significant and show usual signs. Monetary policy looks stabilizing: a positive shock reduces
all macroeconomic and financial variables.
4.6 Monetary policy, inequality and redistribution
Finally, we question the relevance of our baseline results after taking into account redistributive
policies. It is well-known that the inequality debate has raised questions on the extent towhich
redistribution policies could mitigate income dispersion. Meanwhile, questions arose on the
possible impact of redistributive transfers on economic growth. Using data from the SWIID
on Gini coefficients for 35 developed and developing countries, Berg et al. (2018) study
the relationship between inequality, redistribution and growth. In particular, they compute
redistributive transfers as the difference between the Gini coefficient for market income and
for net income inequality, and test their impact on per capita growth. They notably show that
the effects of redistribution are on average pro-growth.
We follow their identification of redistributive transfers and allow the latter to endogenously
vary in the Panel VAR framework. Introducing redistributive transfers in the vector of endoge-
nous variables has two advantages: first, it gives an assessment of the impact of redistribution
policies on the contribution of monetary policy shocks to market income inequality; second,
it highlights the possibility of a dynamic causal effect of monetary policy on the level of
redistribution policies. The vector of endogenous variables takes the following ordering:
shadow rate) and stock prices.
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Yit =

Gini coefficient
Redistributive transfers
Output
Prices
Policy instrument
Stock returns

Results are reported in figures 29 and 30. The model exhibits the same effects on macroeco-
nomic variables as the baseline. An increase of 100 b.p of the nominal policy rate produces a
maximum impact of .06 on the Gini coefficient 3 years after the shock. Moreover, a temporary
positive shock on the shadow rate has a slightly higher effect on income inequality (a peak
increase of .08 in the Gini coefficient 3 years after the shock). In terms of magnitude, this
finding is quite similar to what the Panel VAR has documented when using the netGini as the
main inequalitymeasure. Therefore, this confirms that the effect ofmonetary policy on income
inequality (before taxes and transfers) is lower when redistribution is taken into account. It
also confirms that despite redistributive transfers, the impact of monetary policy on income
inequality still holds.
Results also point out that a positive monetary policy shock increases redistributive transfers.
This effect is, however, weakly significant and not persistent in the context of conventional
monetary policy, while the opposite is true for a temporary shock on the shadow rate. This
would lend support to the conclusion by Berg et al. (2018) that “more unequal societies tend
to redistribute more“.
5 Conclusion
The topic of monetary policy and inequality has raised a debate among academics and poli-
cymakers in the U.S. Yet, what do we know about the distributional effects of monetary policy
in the Eurozone? This paper seeks to examine the redistributive impacts of monetary policy
in 10 EA economies over the period 2000-2015. Our contribution to the literature on monetary
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policy and income distribution is twofold. First, we use comprehensive standardized data on
income inequality and mobilize three different indicators: Gini coefficient, net Gini and the
S80/S20 ratio. Second, monetary policy stance is proxied by the nominal short-term interest
rate and the shadow rate à la Wu-Xia. This is done in order to jointly capture the standard
and non-standard measures implemented by the ECB. Monetary policy shocks are identi-
fied – using a Cholesky decomposition – as innovations to the policy rate (or shadow rate),
which do not contemporaneously affect macroeconomic conditions. Empirically, we estimate
a Panel VAR model with quarterly data and generate IRFs of income inequality indicators to
a monetary policy shock.
The obtained results indicate that contractionarymonetary policy increases income inequality.
The effect is statistically significant for the three indicators of inequality, though small in
magnitude. These results are consistent with the empirical findings of Coibion et al. (2017)
and more specifically Guerello (2018). The results hold up to a battery of robustness checks,
including the introduction of complementary sets of ordering, inequality data from theWorld
Inequality Database and a different proxy of unconventional monetary policies. In addition,
our paper offers two contributions as: (i) we do not find a striking difference in terms of impact
on inequality between conventional and unconventional monetary policy; and (ii) the effects
on income inequality in the 10 EA economies appear to be driven by conventional monetary
policy measures, primarily in periphery countries (i.e. Southern European countries). In
contrast with most papers on the topic, we have checked that results continue to hold after
redistributive transfers are taken into account. Two implications can be drawn from these
results. First, the recent non-standard monetary policy implemented by the ECB are likely
to have reduced income inequality or, at worst, produced a negligible impact on income
distribution. Second, the normalization of monetary policy may raise income inequality in
the euro area. While this rise may be limited, it is important for policymakers to anticipate it.
Then they could try to elude, with redistributive policies, that this limited rise in inequality is
perceived as the last straw that breaks the camel’s back.
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6 Main figures
Figure 3.2: Country-level monetary policy shocks (Conventional)
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Figure 3.3: Country-level monetary policy shocks (Unconventional)
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Figure 4: Responses to a shock on the policy rate, baseline model
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality and other macroeconomic variables to a 100 b.p. increase in
the policy rate. The vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid line is
the point estimate and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 5: Responses to a shock on the shadow rate, baseline model
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality and other macroeconomic variables to a 100 b.p. increase
in the shadow rate. The vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid
line is the point estimate and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 6: Responses to a shock on the policy rate, baseline model
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
Net Gini
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
S80/S20
Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality indicators to a 100 b.p. increase in the policy rate. The
vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid line is the point estimate
and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 7: Responses to a shock on the shadow rate, baseline model
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality indicators to a 100 b.p. increase in the shadow rate. The
vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid line is the point estimate
and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 8: FEVD of Gini coefficient (shock to policy rate), baseline model
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Figure 9: FEVD of Gini coefficient (shock to the shadow rate), baseline model
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Figure 10: Responses to a shock on the policy rate (Ordering à la Guerello)
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality and other macroeconomic variables to a 100 b.p. increase
in the shadow rate. The vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid
line is the point estimate and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 11: Responses to a shock on the shadow rate (Ordering à la Guerello)
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality and other macroeconomic variables to a 100 b.p. increase
in the shadow rate. The vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid
line is the point estimate and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 12: Responses to a shock on the policy rate (ordering à la Guerello)
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality indicators to a 100 b.p. increase in the policy rate. The
vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid line is the point estimate
and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 13: Responses to a shock on the shadow rate (ordering à la Guerello)
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality indicators to a 100 b.p. increase in the shadow rate. The
vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid line is the point estimate
and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 14: Responses to a shock on the policy rate (ordered last)
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality and other macroeconomic variables to a 100 b.p. increase
in the shadow rate. The vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid
line is the point estimate and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 15: Responses to a shock on the shadow rate (ordered last)
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality and other macroeconomic variables to a 100 b.p. increase
in the shadow rate. The vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid
line is the point estimate and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 16: Responses to a shock on the policy rate (ordered last)
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality indicators to a 100 b.p. increase in the policy rate. The
vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid line is the point estimate
and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 17: Responses to a shock on the shadow rate (ordered last)
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality indicators to a 100 b.p. increase in the shadow rate. The
vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid line is the point estimate
and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 18: Responses to a shock on the policy rate, WID Gini
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality and other macroeconomic variables to a 100 b.p. increase in
the policy rate. The vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid line is
the point estimate and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 19: Responses to a shock on the shadow rate, WID Gini
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality and other macroeconomic variables to a 100 b.p. increase
in the shadow rate. The vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid
line is the point estimate and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 20: Responses to a shock on the shadow rate of Krippner (2015)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Gini
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
Net Gini
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
S80/S20
Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality indicators to a 100 b.p. increase in the shadow rate of
Krippner. The vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid line is the
point estimate and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 21: Responses to a shock on the policy rate (Northern Europe economies)
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality measures to a 100 b.p. increase in the policy rate. The
vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid line is the point estimate
and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 22: Responses to a shock on the shadow rate (Northern Europe economies)
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality indicators to a 100 b.p. increase in the shadow rate. The
vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid line is the point estimate
and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 23: Responses to a shock on the policy rate (Southern Europe economies).
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality indicators to a 100 b.p. increase in the policy rate. The
vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid line is the point estimate
and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 24: Responses to a shock on the shadow rate (Southern Europe economies)
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality indicators to a 100 b.p. increase in the shadow rate. The
vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid line is the point estimate
and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 25: Responses to a shock on the Shadow rate (2008Q3-2015Q3)
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality indicators to a 100 b.p. increase in the shadow rate. The
vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid line is the point estimate
and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 26: Responses to a shock on the policy rate (2000Q3-ZLB)
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality indicators to a 100 b.p. increase in the policy rate. The
vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid line is the point estimate
and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 27: Responses to a shock on the policy rate, VAR(7)
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality and other macroeconomic variables to a 100 b.p. increase in
the policy rate. The vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid line is
the point estimate and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 28: Responses to a shock on the shadow rate, VAR(7)
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality and other macroeconomic variables to a 100 b.p. increase
in the shadow rate. The vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid
line is the point estimate and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 29: Responses to a shock on the policy rate, VAR(6)
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality and other macroeconomic variables to a 100 b.p. increase in
the policy rate. The vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid line is
the point estimate and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 30: Responses to a shock on the shadow rate, VAR(6)
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality and other macroeconomic variables to a 100 b.p. increase
in the shadow rate. The vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid
line is the point estimate and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
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7 Appendix
Table 1: Description of country level data and sources
Variable Variable definition Source
Real GDP Seasonally and calendar adjusted,
chain linked volumes (2005), mln euro Eurostat
Stock returns Stock prices index Yahoo Finance
Consumption deflator Ratio of nominal to real (chain linked volumes, index 2005=100)
final consumption expenditure of households Eurostat, own calculations
Short term interest rate Euribor 3-month, average of observations through period ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
Employment Total employed population OECD.Stat
Real house price index Seasonally adjusted, ratio of nominal price
to the consumers’ expenditure deflator OECD.Stat
Income inequality Gini coefficient for market and disposable incomes.
The ratio of total income received by the 20 % of the population
with the highest income to that received by the 20 %
of the population with the lowest income Solt (2016) and OECD.Stat
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7.1 The Chow-Lin regression-based method
We follow Cholette and Dagum (2006)’s notation and assumewe are studying a variable series
y• available on an annual basis along with a set of corresponding quarterly indicator x. The
objective consists in obtaining the corresponding 3n quarterly estimates of the series y• . To do
so, the corresponding quarterly estimates of y must satisfy the following standard multiple
regression:
y = Xβ + u,E(u) = 0, E(uu′) = V (1)
where y is a 3nx1 vector of quarterly non-observable data X is a 3n×p matrix of the related
indicator series and u is a random error assumed to follow autoregessive model of order 1.
To ensure the linear interpolation from annual to quarterly series, the n-dimensional annual
series of y• must also satisfy (1), which implies:
y• = Cy= CXβ + Cu = X•β + u• , E(u•u′•) = CV C ′ = V• (2)
where C = In ⊗ c with c is a 3x1 matrix, which, stands for temporal distribution when
c = [1 1 1] and interpolationwhen c = [0 0 1]. ChowandLin (1971) introduce amx1 vector
z for potential extrapolations outside the temporal range of y• along with its corresponding
regressors Xz . Hence, the Chow-Lin regression model becomes z = Xzβ + uz , with the best
linear unbiased estimator of zˆ:
zˆ = Ay• = Xz βˆ + Vz•V
−1uˆz• (3)
where A is a nxmmatrix and AX• −Xz = 0, with such constraint ensuring the unbiasedness
property of the estimator. That said, determining the value of matrix A allows to obtain
βˆ = (X ′•V
−1
• X•)
−1X ′•V
−1
• y• , which corresponds to the generalized least square estimator of
the regression coefficients using the n annual observations.
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Figure 31: Responses to a shock on the policy rate (Baseline model)
Income inequality measure: net Gini
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Figure 32: Responses to a shock on the shadow rate (Baseline model)
Income inequality measure: net Gini
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Figure 33: Responses to a shock on the policy rate (Baseline model)
Income inequality measure: S80/S20
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Figure 34: Responses to a shock on the shadow rate (Baseline model)
Income inequality measure: S80/S20
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Figure 35: Responses to a shock on the policy rate (Ordering à la Guerello)
Income inequality measure: net Gini
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Figure 36: Responses to a shock on the shadow rate (Ordering à la Guerello)
Income inequality measure: net Gini
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Figure 37: Responses to a shock on the policy rate (Ordering à la Guerello)
Income inequality measure: S80/S20
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Figure 38: Responses to a shock on the shadow rate (Ordering à la Guerello)
Income inequality measure: S80/S20
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Figure 39: Responses to a shock on the policy rate (ordered last)
Income inequality measure: net Gini
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Figure 40: Responses to a shock on the shadow rate (ordered last)
Income inequality measure: net Gini
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Figure 41: Responses to a shock on the policy rate (ordered last)
Income inequality measure: S80/S20
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Figure 42: Responses to a shock on the shadow rate (ordered last)
Income inequality measure: S80/S20
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Figure 43: Responses to a shock on the policy rate, VAR(7) - net Gini
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality indicators to a 100 b.p. increase in the policy rate. The
vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid line is the point estimate
and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 44: Responses to a shock on the shadow rate, VAR(7) - net Gini
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality indicators to a 100 b.p. increase in the shadow rate. The
vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid line is the point estimate
and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 45: Responses to a shock on the policy rate, VAR(7) - S80/S20
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality indicators to a 100 b.p. increase in the policy rate. The
vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid line is the point estimate
and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 46: Responses to a shock on the shadow rate, VAR(7) - S80/S20
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of income inequality indicators to a 100 b.p. increase in the shadow rate. The
vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation of the variable after a monetary policy shock. The solid line is the point estimate
and the shaded areas are 90 percent confidence intervals.
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